The H-Bomb and the Invasion of Japan
How the Atomic Bombs Saved More Lives Than They Took
On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Had it not been dropped, the planned invasion of Japan[i] would have gone through, and the numbers of the dead would be much higher. This invasion was meant “To force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by:
(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockade, conducting intensive air bombardments and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of JAPAN.”[ii]
This plan would have greatly changed the outcome of the war in the Pacific: The US would still have won, but both sides would have lost many more men. The plan assumed that there would be six to ten Japanese divisions on the southern island, and that there would be about twenty-one divisions in the northern island, plus a “fanatically hostile population”.[iii] In anticipation for this attack, supplies were manufactured in large numbers, including Purple Hearts for the wounded.[iv] However, the Japanese had anticipated an American invasion.[v]
The Japanese had mined the waters around the southern island, Kyushu,[vi] and built an underground palace and command center.[vii] They had also set up 300 bombers, mostly converted to kamikaze or “crash-landing planes” for anti-landing defenses, as well as [viii] fighters and “Baka”, which were small rocket-planes filled with explosives.
Various estimates of casualties give numbers from 40,000 to 800,000 dead and wounded of the Americans alone. No-one was quite sure how much of a dent the Japanese forces would be able to make. The various people who made the studies of how large the casualties would be agree on one thing: the invasion would be one of the most costly American operations in the Pacific.
The atomic bombs, with all their horror, still saved lives in their use. They ended the necessity of an invasion. The bombs killed 150,000 to 246,000 people.[ix] The American losses alone would have filled more than that number.
[i] Operation Downfall was planned near the end of WWII. "DOWNFALL": Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago (DECLASSIFIED) (PCN:140 123900 00) (PDF version)
[ii] Downfall Page 10, Section 1, Part (b)
[iii] Downfall pages 11-12, section 2
“2. ASSUMPTIONS.
a. Hostile. (See Annex 2 a, G-2 Estimate of the Hostile
Situation in the Pacific Area (Under separate cover ).)
(1) That the Japanese will continue the war to the utmost extent of their capabilities and will prepare to defend the main islands of JAPAN with every means available to them. That operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.
(2) That approximately three (3) hostile divisions will be disposed in Southern KYUSHU and an additional three (3) in Northern KYUSHU at initiation of the OLYMPIC operation.
(3) That total hostile forces committed against KYUSHU operation will not exceed eight (8) to ten (10) divisions and that this level will be easily attained.
(4) That approximately twenty-one (21 ) hostile divisions, including depot divisions, will b on HONSHU at initiation of that operation and that fourteen (14) of these divisions may be employed in the KANTO PLAIN area.
(5)That the enemy may withdraw his land-based air forces to the Asiatic Mainland for protection from our neutralizing attacks. That under ouch circumstances he can possibly amass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that area by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against KYUSHU landings by staging through homeland fields.
(6)That the attrition caused by our continued land-baaed and carrier-baaed air preparation and support, and by our destruction of aircraft manufacturing and maintenance facilities, will reduce the hostile capability for air action against our landings to suicide attacks of uncertain proportion an early phase of the operation.
(7) That hostile fleet elements will be forced to withdraw to the YELLOW SEA or Western SEA OF JAPAN. That the enemy will maintain the capability of a suicide attack againat KYUSHU landings with the approximate strength of a typical carrier task group. That tha remaining submarines and large numbers of small suicide craft will oppose our landings and that mines will be used in large numbers.
(8)That hostile sea communications across the JAPAN SEA, while relatively unimpaired prior to KYUSHU landings, will be progressively and rapidly restricted to complete interdiction by the time air ia operating from HONSHU.
(9)That during continuation of Russian neutrality, the production capacity of hostile industries and raw material sources in MANCHURIA, North CHINA and KOREA will remain relatively unimpaired.
(10) That hostile logistic position will permit determined defense in areas oi projected operations by hostile ground forces enumerated in (3) and ( 4 ) above.
b. Own Forces.
( 1 ) That the entire resources available to the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Army Forces in the Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet will be available for the support of these operations.
(2) That there will be no effective redeployment of major ground combat units
from EUROPE in time for commitment prior to early 1946.
(3) That entry of RUSSIA into the war against JAPAN at some stage of ,he
operations may be expected.
(4) That United States Forces will be established on the line BONINS-Sorthern
RYUKYUS at initiation of the operations.
(5) That at initiation of the operationa, land-baaed air forces will have attained
offensive air superiority over Southern KYUSHU. That strategic land and
carrier-baaed air forces will have effectively crippled the hostile aircraft
and electronics industries and reduced capacity of rail iines in Southern
HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUS13U to an extent providing little capacity
beyond tactical needs.
(6) That at initiation of the operations the United States Pacific Fleet will
dominate waters eaat ot the main iaiands of JAPAN, and the EAST CH 1S A
SEA and as far north as Southern KYUSHU. That forward naval bases
will be functioning in the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS and MARIANAS.
[iv] “Are New Purple Hearts Being Manufactured to Meet the Demand?” by By D.M Giangreco and Kathryn Moore http://hnn.us/articles/1801.html
[v] CIA Declassified paper at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-final-months-of-the-war-with-japan-signals-intelligence-u-s-invasion-planning-and-the-a-bomb-decision/csi9810001.html The Final Months of the War With Japan
by Douglas J. MacEachin
[vi] Final Months Part II “Evidence of Japanese Preperations” Figure 1:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are visible on this map.
[vii] Drea, Edward J. (2003). In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0803266383 pages 206-207
[viii] “The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu” by H.V. White, page 4, question 12.
[ix] The Radioactive Effects Research Foundation http://www.rerf.or.jp/general/qa_e/qa1.html
